Lack of well-defined property rights of land is an oft-cited reason for lackluster growth in Africa.
Transition to well-defined land rights can be both costly and can induce conflict.
Dufwenberg and colleagues (Dufwenberg et al. (2016)) examine whether a ‘credible threat’ of government resolution reduces incedences of land conflict.
A costly option to enforce equal division and social preferences can turn a dilemma game into a coordination game.
\[U(x_i, z) = v(x_i - z) + v \frac{z}{4}\\ z(x_i, x_{-i}) = \max \{x_i + x_{-i} - T, 0\}.\]
Here \(T = 4\) and \(v = 8\).
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0, 0 | 0, 8 | 0, 16 | 0, 24 | 0, 32 |
| 1 | 8, 0 | 8, 8 | 8, 16 | 8, 24 | 2, 26 |
| 2 | 16, 0 | 16, 8 | 16, 16 | 10, 18 | 4, 20 |
| 3 | 24, 0 | 24, 8 | 18, 10 | 12, 12 | 6, 14 |
| 4 | 32, 0 | 26, 2 | 20, 4 | 14, 6 | 8, 8 |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 |
| 1 | 0, 0 | 8, 8 | 8, 8 | 8, 8 | 2, 2 |
| 2 | 0, 0 | 8, 8 | 16, 16 | 10, 10 | 4, 4 |
| 3 | 0, 0 | 8, 8 | 10, 10 | 12, 12 | 6, 6 |
| 4 | 0, 0 | 2, 2 | 4, 4 | 6, 6 | 8, 8 |
Either player may choose a new option \(D\): invoke the divider. The divider charges a fee \(t = 10\) that is shared between the players and allocates the land equally between the two. If neither player chooses \(D\), then they play the original game.
| D | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D | 11, 11 | 11, 11 | 11, 11 | 11, 11 | 11, 11 | 11, 11 |
| 0 | 11, 11 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 |
| 1 | 11, 11 | 0, 0 | 8, 8 | 8, 8 | 8, 8 | 2, 2 |
| 2 | 11, 11 | 0, 0 | 8, 8 | 16, 16 | 10, 10 | 4, 4 |
| 3 | 11, 11 | 0, 0 | 8, 8 | 10, 10 | 12, 12 | 6, 6 |
| 4 | 11, 11 | 0, 0 | 2, 2 | 4, 4 | 6, 6 | 8, 8 |
| D | 2 | 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| D | 11, 11 | 11, 11 | 11, 11 |
| 2 | 11, 11 | 16, 16 | 10, 10 |
| 3 | 11, 11 | 10, 10 | 12, 12 |
| 2 | 3 | |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 16, 16 | 10, 10 |
| 3 | 10, 10 | 12, 12 |
Compare behavior in games with and without the divider option, allowing participants to choose how much land they want to claim.
H1: Since 0 and 1 are weakly dominated, few subjects will choose those options in either treatment.
H2: The Divider option will induce subjects to choose other actions that to play 4.
H3: D is weakly dominated in the Divider treatment so few subjects will choose it.
H4: 2 and 3 are more prevalent in the Divider treatment than the no-Divider treatment.
H5: 2 is more frequently chosen than 3 in the Divider treatment.
H6: If players believe the other player will choose 2, 3, or 4, they are more likely to choose that same action.
| High conflict\(^a\) | High conflict\(^b\) | No/Low Conflict\(^c\) | No conflict\(^d\) | No conflict\(^e\) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Divider Tx | \(-0.496^{***}\) | \(-0.309^{**}\) | 0.173 | \(0.300^{**}\) | \(0.315^{*}\) |
| N | \(477\) | \(319\) | \(404\) | \(404\) | \(280\) |
| Related H | H2 | H2/H4 | H4 | H4/H5 | H5 |
\(^a\) 1 if claim is 4, 0 otherwise.
\(^b\) 1 if claim is 4, 0 if claim is 2.
\(^c\) 1 if claim is 2 or 3, 0 otherwise; D are excluded.
\(^d\) 1 if claim is 2, 0 otherwise; D are excluded.
\(^e\) 1 if claim is 2, 0 if claim is 3.
The credible threat of the Divider induces more cooperation, therefore offering detailed mapping and resolution at some cost may encourage negotiation instead, which is much less costly.
Players do not fully forward induct, in that choosing 2 or 3 is not different than other options for those who did not choose D (H4).
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Social Preference Literature